Why domain transactions are scam-prone
A domain sale is a one-time transfer of an intangible asset between strangers, often for four or five figures, with no built-in reversal mechanism once the transfer completes. That combination — high value, irreversible, no physical delivery to verify — is exactly the profile scammers target.
Use escrow, every time
Escrow.com (or a marketplace's built-in escrow, like Dan.com or Afternic) holds the buyer's funds until the domain transfer is confirmed, then releases payment to the seller. Never send payment directly for a domain you haven't received, and never release a domain before funds have actually cleared — "payment sent" screenshots are trivially faked.
Buyer-side checks before paying
Confirm the seller in the transaction actually controls the domain — check WHOIS/RDAP registrant details match who you're talking to, and ask them to add a TXT record or make a small, reversible DNS change you specify as proof of control. A seller who can't touch DNS doesn't own the domain.
Seller-side checks before transferring
Only release the auth code / initiate transfer after escrow confirms funds received, not after a buyer says they've paid. Watch for buyers who pressure you to skip escrow "to save fees" — that pressure is itself the red flag, since it's almost always the buyer proposing to skip the one step that protects you both.
Red flags either direction
Urgency ("I need this today or I walk"), requests to communicate off-platform after first contact on a marketplace, and prices meaningfully above or below market with no clear reason are the three most common scam patterns in domain sales. None of them are proof of a scam alone — together, they're a reason to slow down and insist on escrow.